JUUDICIAL REVIEW : NUISANCE OR NECESSITY

                                                 Introduction 

The aim of this article is to understand and appreciate the role played by the Indian judiciary in the establishment of an orderly and civilized society. The project further attempts to trace and identify the true nature of judicial review as prevailing in India.A theme of uneasiness, and even of guilt, colours the literature about the judicial review. Many of those who have talked, lectured, and written about the Constitution have been troubled by a sense that judicial review is “undemocratic”. They argue that the strength of the courts has weakened other parts of the government[1]. This legal debate raises the important and inevitable question that how far this statement holds true about judicial review powers and capacities of the Indian Judiciary.

The Indian Constitution, like other written Constitutions, follows the concept of “Separation of powers” between the three sovereign organs of the Constitution. The doctrine of separation of powers stated in its rigid form means that each of the organ of the Constitution, namely, executive, legislature and judiciary should operate in its own sphere and there should be no overlapping between their functioning. The Indian Constitution has not recognized the doctrine of separation of powers in its absolute form but the functions of the different organs have been clearly differentiated and consequently it can very well be said that our Constitution does not contemplate assumption, by one organ of the functions that essentially belongs to another[2]. Though the Constitution has adopted the parliamentary form of government, where the dividing line between the legislature and the executive becomes thin, the theory of separation of powers is still valid[3].

                                Independence of Judiciary

Even though the Constitution of India does not accept strict separation of powers, it provides for an independent judiciary with extensive jurisdiction over the acts of the legislature and the executive[4]. Independent judiciary is the most essential attribute of rule of law and is indispensable to sustain democracy. Independence and integrity of the judiciary in a democratic system of government is of the highest importance and interest not only to the judges but also to the people at large who seek judicial redress against perceived legal injury or executive excess. Judicial review is the basic structure, independent judiciary is the cardinal feature, and an assurance of faith enshrined in the Constitution. The need for independent and impartial judiciary is the command of the Constitution and call of the people. The subordinate judiciary is a complement to constitutional courts as part of the constitutional scheme and plays a vital part in dispensation of justice. Thus, subordinate courts are integral part of the judiciary under the constitution[5].

In Ajay Gandhi v B.Singh[6] the Supreme Court extended the “theory of independence” to Tribunals performing judicial functions. The court observed: “The functions of the Tribunal being judicial in nature, the public have a major stake in its functioning, for effective and orderly administration of justice. A Tribunal should, as far as possible, have a judicial autonomy. The relevant provisions have conferred a statutory power upon the president to constitute Benches. The appellate Tribunal is a National Tribunal. The President, subject to delegation of powers senior Vice- President or the Vice-President, exercises the administrative control over the members thereof. The benches are to be constituted only by the President. No other authority is empowered to do so. Keeping in view the fact that the independence of the Tribunal is essential for maintaining its independence, any power which may be conferred upon the executive authority must proved to be in the interest of imparting justice. We are of the view that this long-standing practice should be allowed to prevail over the stand of the respondents herein. However, we are of the opinion that by reason thereof, the President cannot be said to have an unguided, unfettered and unlimited jurisdiction as the same may be flawed with great consequences”.

                   Scope and components of judicial review 

 Broadly speaking, judicial review in India comprises of three aspects: judicial review of legislative action, judicial review of judicial decisions and judicial review of administrative action. The judges of the superior courts have been entrusted with the task of upholding the Constitution and to this end, have been conferred the power to interpret it. It is they who have to ensure that the balance of power envisaged by the Constitution is maintained and that the legislature and the executive do not, in the discharge of functions, transgress constitutional limitations[7]. Thus, judicial review is a highly complex and developing subject. It has its roots long back and its scope and extent varies from case to case. It is considered to be the basic feature of the Constitution. The court in its exercise of its power of judicial review would zealously guard the human rights, fundamental rights and the citizens’ rights of life and liberty as also many non-statutory powers of governmental bodies as regards their control over property and assets of various kinds, which could be expended on building, hospitals, roads and the like, or overseas aid, or compensating victims of crime[8].

In U.O.I v K.M.Shankarappa[9] the Supreme Court held that the provision for revision by Central Government of decisions of the Appellant Tribunal under Section 6(1) of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court observed:

“The Government has chosen to establish a quasi-judicial body which has been given the powers, inter alia, to decide the effect of the film on the public. Once a quasi-judicial body like the Appellate Tribunal gives its decision, that decision would be final and binding so far as the executive and the government is concerned. To permit the executive to review or revise that decision would amount to interference with the exercise of judicial functions by a quasi-judicial board. It would amount to subjecting the decision of a quasi-judicial body to the scrutiny of the executive. Under the Indian Constitution, the executives have to obey the judicial orders. Thus, Section 6(2) is a travesty of the rule of law, which is one of the basic structures of the Constitution. The legislature may, in certain cases, nullify a judicial or executive decision by enacting an appropriate legislation. However, without enacting an appropriate legislation, the executive or the legislature cannot set at naught a judicial order. The executive cannot sit in an appeal or review or revise a judicial order. At the highest, the government may apply to the Tribunal itself for a review, if circumstances so warrant. But the government would be bound by the ultimate decision of the Tribunal”.

In the landmark judgment of P.U.C.L v U.O.I[10] Justice Shah observed: “The legislature in this country has no power to ask the instrumentalities of the State to disobey or disregard the decisions given by the courts. The legislature may remove the defect, which is the cause for invalidating the law by the court by appropriate legislation if it has power over the subject matter and competent to do so under the Constitution. The primary duty of the judiciary is to uphold the Constitution and the laws without fear or favour, without being biased by political ideology or economic theory. Interpretation should be in consonance with the constitutional provisions, which envisage a republic democracy. Survival of democracy depends upon free and fair election. It is true that political parties fight elections, yet elections would be farce if the voters were unaware of antecedents of candidates contesting elections. Such election would be neither free nor fair”.

These bold words of Justice Shah reflect the status, which the Indian judiciary is holding in the Indian Constitutional set up. The constitution makers have reposed great confidence and trust in Indian judiciary by conferring on it such powers as have made it one of the most powerful judiciary in the world.  The Supreme Court has from time to time indulged in genuine and needful judicial activism and judicial review. It gave birth to the famous and most needed “Doctrine of basic Structure”. The need of the changing society encouraged it to formulate and incorporate various theories, which originated outside India. One of such theory, which has great practical and social significance in India, is the “Doctrine of proportionality”. The said doctrine originated as far back as in the 19^th century in Russia and was later adopted by Germany, France and other European countries. By proportionality, it is meant that the question whether while regulating the exercise of fundamental rights, the appropriate or least restrictive choice of measures has been made by the legislature or the administrator so as to achieve the object of the legislation or the purpose of the administrative order, as the case may be. Under the principle, the court will see that the legislature and the administrative authority maintain a proper balance between the adverse effects which the legislation or the administrative order may have on the rights, liberties or interests of persons keeping in mind the purpose for which they were intended to serve[11].

The court as far back as in 1952 in State of Madras v V.G.Row[12] observed: “ The test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all the cases. The nature of right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at that time, should all enter the judicial verdict. In evaluating such elusive factors and forming their own conceptions of what is reasonable, in all the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the scale of values of the judge participating in the decision would play an important part, and limit to their interference with legislative judgment in such cases can only be dictated by their sense of responsibility and self-restraint and the sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant not only for people of their way of thinking but for all, and the majority of the elected representatives of the people have, in authorizing the imposition of the restrictions, considered them to be reasonable”.

Ever since 1952, the principle of proportionality has been applied vigorously to legislative and administrative action in India. Thus, administrative action in India affecting the fundamental rights has always been tested on the anvil of the proportionality in the last 50 years even though it has not been expressly stated that the principle that is applied is the proportionality principle.

In Om Kumar v U.O.I[13], however, the Apex Court evolved the principle of primary and secondary review. The doctrine of primary review was held to be applicable in relation to the statutes, statutory rules, or any order, which has force of statute. The secondary review was held to be applicable inter alia in relation to the action in a case where the executive is guilty of acting arbitrarily. In such a case Article 14 of the Constitution of India would be attracted[14]. In relation to other administrative actions, as for example punishment in a departmental proceeding, the doctrine of proportionality was equated with Wednesbury’s unreasonable[15].

In Delhi Development Authority v M/S UEE Electricals Engg.P.Ltd[16] the Supreme Court dealt with the judicial review of administrative action in detail. The court observed: “One can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground is “illegality”, the second “irrationality”, and the third “procedural impropriety”. Courts are slow to interfere in matters relating to administrative functions unless decision is tainted by any vulnerability such as, lack of fairness in the procedure, illegality and irrationality. Whether action falls in any of the categories has to be established. Mere assertion in this regard would not be sufficient. The law is settled that in considering challenge to administrative decisions courts will not interfere as if they are sitting in appeal over the decision. He who seeks to invalidate or nullify any act or order must establish the charge of bad faith, an abuse or a misuse by the authority of its powers. It cannot be overlooked that burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. The allegations of mala fides are often more easily made than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility”.

The administrative orders must also satisfy the rigorous tests of the “doctrine of legitimate expectation”. The principle of legitimate expectation is at the root of the rule of law and requires regularity, predictability and certainty in government’s dealings with the public. For a legitimate expectation to arise, the decisions of the administrative authority must affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either:

(i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there has been communicated to him some rationale grounds for withdrawing it or where he has been given an opportunity to comment; or

(ii) he has received assurance from the decision maker that they will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn.

The procedural part of it relates to a representation that a hearing or other appropriate procedure will be afforded before the decision is made. The substantive part of the principle is that if a representation is made than a benefit of substantive nature will be granted or if the person is already in receipt of the benefit than it will be continued and not be substantially varied, then the same could be enforced. An exception could be based on an express promise or representation or by established past action or settled conduct. The representation must be clear and unambiguous. It could be a representation to an individual or to a class of persons”[17].

Another effective tool in the hands of judiciary, to test the validity of legislation, is to invoke the principle of “reading down”. The rule of reading down a provision of the law is now well established and recognized. It is a rule of harmonious construction in a different name. It is resorted to smoothen the crudities or ironing the creases found in a statute to make it workable. In the garb of reading down, however, it is not open to read words or expressions not found in it and thus venture into a kind of judicial legislation. The rule of reading down is to be used for the limited purpose of making a particular provision workable and to bring it in harmony with other provisions of the statute. It is to be used keeping in view the scheme of the statute and to fulfill its purposes[18].

In B.R.Enterprises v State of U.P[19] the Supreme Court observed: “First attempt should be made by the courts to uphold the charged provisions and not to invalidate it merely because one of the possible interpretation leads to such a result, howsoever attractive it may be. Thus, where there are two possible interpretations, one invalidating the law and the other upholding, the latter should be adopted. For this, the courts have been endeavoring, sometimes to give restrictive or expansive meaning keeping in view the nature of the legislation. Cumulatively, it is to sub serve the object of the legislation. Old golden rule is of respecting the wisdom of the legislature, that they are aware of the law and would never have intended for an invalid legislation. This also keeps the courts within their track and checks. Yet inspite of this, if the impugned legislation cannot be saved, the courts shall not hesitate to strike it down. Here the courts have to play a cautious role of weeding out the wild from the crop, of course, without infringing the Constitution. The principle of reading down, however, will not be available where the plain and literal meaning from a bare reading of any impugned of any impugned provision clearly shows that it confers arbitrary or unbridled power”

            It must be appreciated that a statute carries with it a presumption of constitutionality. Such a presumption extends also in relation to a law, which has been enacted for imposing reasonable restrictions on the fundamental rights. A further presumption may also be drawn that the statutory authority would not exercise the power arbitrarily[20]. Further, where a power is conferred upon a higher authority, a presumption can be raised that he would be conscious of his duties and therefore will act accordingly[21]. These presumptions have to be rebutted before an allegation of unconstitutionality of a statute can be sustained.

                                                 Limits of Judicial Review

It is true that the courts have wide powers of judicial review of Constitutional and statutory provisions. These powers, however, must be exercised with great caution and self-control. The courts should not step out of the limits of their legitimate powers of judicial review. The parameters of judicial review of Constitutional provisions and statutory provisions are totally different. In J.P.Bansal v State of Rajasthan[22] the Supreme Court observed: “It is true that this court in interpreting the Constitution enjoys a freedom which is not available in interpreting a statute. It endangers continued public interest in the impartiality of the judiciary, which is essential to the continuance of rule of law, if judges, under guise of interpretation, provide their own preferred amendments to statutes which experience of their operation has shown to have had consequences that members of the court before whom the matters come consider to be injurious to public interest. Where the words are clear, there is no obscurity, there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to innovate or to take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions. In that situation the judge should not proclaim that they are playing the role of lawmaker merely for an exhibition of judicial valour. They have to remember that there is a line, though thin, which separates adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed or erased. This can be vouchsafed by an alert recognition of the necessity not to cross it and instinctive, as well as trained reluctance to do so”.

If case the court forgets to appreciate this judicial wisdom, it would undermine the constitutional mandate and will disturb the equilibrium between the three sovereign organs of the Constitution. In State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) v Prem Raj[23] the Supreme Court took a serious note of this disturbing exercise when the High Court commuted the sentence by transgressing its limits. The court observed:

“The power of commutation exclusively vests with the appropriate government. The appropriate government means the Central government in cases where the sentence or order relates to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends, and the state government in other cases. Thus, the order of the high Court is set aside”.

Similarly, in Syed T.A. Haqshbandi v State of J&K[24] the Supreme Court observe: “Judicial review is permissible only to the extent of finding whether the process in reaching the decision has been observed correctly and not the decision itself, as such. Critical or independent analysis or appraisal of the materials by the court exercising powers of judicial review unlike the case of an appellate court would neither be permissible nor conducive to the interests of either the officer concerned or the system and institutions. Grievances must be sufficiently substantiated to have firm or concrete basis on properly established facts and further proved to be well justified in law, for being countenanced by the court in exercise of its powers of judicial review. Unless the exercise of power is shown to violate any other provision of the Constitution of India or any of the statutory rules, the same cannot be challenged by making it a justiciable issue before the court”.

The courts are further required not to interfere in policy matters and political questions unless it is absolutely essential to do so. Even then also the courts can interfere on selective grounds only. In P.U.C.L v U.O.I[25] the Supreme Court observed: “This court cannot go into and examine the need of Prevention of Terrorism Act. It is a matter of policy. Once legislation is passed, the government has an obligation to exercise all available options to prevent terrorism within the bounds of the Constitution. Moreover, mere possibility of abuse cannot be counted as a ground for denying the vesting of powers or for declaring a statute unconstitutional”.

Similarly, in U.O.I. v International Trading Co[26] the Supreme Court observed: “Article 14 of the Constitution applies also to matters of government policy and if the policy or any action of the government, even in contractual matters, fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, it would be unconstitutional. While the discretion to change the policy in exercise of the executive power, when not trammeled by any statute or rule is wide enough, what is imperative and implicit in terms of Article 14 is that a change in policy must be made fairly and should not give the impression that it was so done arbitrarily or by any other ulterior criteria. The wide sweep of Article 14 and the requirement of every state action qualifying for its validity on this touchstone, irrespective of the field of activity of the state, is an accepted tenet. The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the state, and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance is the heartbeat of fair play. Every state action must be informed by reason and it follows that an act uninformed by reason is per se arbitrary”.

Similarly, where a political question is involved, the courts normally should not interfere. It is also equally settled law that the court should not shrink its duty from performing its functions merely because it has political thicket[27]. Thus, merely because the question has a political complexion that by itself is no ground why the court should shrink from performing its duty under the constitution if it raises an issue of constitutional determination. Every constitutional question concerns the allocation and exercise of governmental power and no constitutional question can, therefore, fail to be political. So large as a question arises whether an authority under the Constitution has acted within the limits of its power or exceeded it, it can certainly be decided by the court. Indeed it would be its constitutional obligation to do so[28].

             In B.R.Kapur v State of T.N[29] the Supreme Court held that it is the duty of the court to interpret the Constitution. It must perform the duty regardless of the fact that the answer to the question would have a political effect.

                                                  Conclusion

 The role model for governance and decision taken thereon should manifest equity, fair play and justice. The cardinal principle of governance in a civilized society based on rule of law not only has to base on transparency but also must create an impression that the decision-making was motivated on the consideration of probity. The government has to rise above the nexus of vested interests and nepotism and eschew window-dressing. The act of governance has to withstand the test of judiciousness and impartiality and avoid arbitrary or capricious actions. Therefore, the principle of governance has to be tested on the touchstone of justice, equity and fair play. Though on the face of it the decision may look legitimate but as a matter of fact the reasons may not be based on values but to achieve popular accolade that decision cannot be allowed to operate[30].

The Constitution of India envisages separation of power between the three organs of the Constitution so that the working of the constitution may not be hampered or jeopardized. This thin and fine line of distinction should never be ignored and transgressed upon by any of the organ of the Constitution, including the judiciary. This rigid perception and practice can be given a go by in cases of “abdication of duties” by one of the organ of the Constitution. Thus, the judiciary can interfere if there is an abdication of duties by the legislature or the executive. For instance, if the legislature delegates its essential and constitutional functions to the executives, it would amount to “excessive delegation” and hence abdication of the legislative functions by the legislature. In such cases, the theory of separation of powers would not come in the way of judiciary while exercising the power of judicial review.

This is more so, when the Constitution makers have conferred the important sovereign function of interpretation of the constitution and various statutes upon the judiciary. The Constitutional courts can even scrutinize the working of the lower courts besides analyzing legislative and executive actions. The superior courts, like High Courts and the Supreme Court, can issue various writs to control the functioning of lower judiciary. Besides, the High Court has supervisory jurisdiction over the lower courts. However, the High court cannot issue a writ against another High court. Similarly, the decision of the High Court or the Supreme Court cannot be questioned by way of a writ proceeding. Thus, a final decision of the Supreme Court cannot be questioned under Article 32 of the constitution of India, except by way of review petition. The Supreme Court in Rupa Ashok Hurra v Ashok Hurra[31] has judicially created an exception to this rule in the form of a “curative petition”. Thus, a curative petition can be filed before the Supreme Court under Article 32 in appropriate cases. The Supreme Court only in exceptional cases would exercise this power. This fantastic judicial innovation is based on the premises that no person should suffer due to the mistake of the court. Similarly, an order passed by the court without jurisdiction is a nullity and any action taken pursuant thereto would also be nullity. A party cannot be made to suffer adversely either directly or indirectly by reason of an order passed by any court of law, which is not binding, on him[32].  

The power to entertain a curative petition is not specifically conferred by the Constitution but can be exercised by the apex court under its inherent powers. This means that the Constitution is organic and living in nature. It is also well settled that the interpretation of the Constitution of India or statutes would change from time to time. Being a living organ, it is ongoing and with passage of time, law must change. New rights may have to be found out within the constitutional scheme. It is established that fundamental rights themselves have no fixed content; most of them are empty vessels into which each generation must pour its contents in the light of its experience. The attempt of the court should be to expand the reach and ambit of the fundamental rights by process of judicial interpretation. There cannot be any distinction between the fundamental rights mentioned in Chapter III of the Constitution and the declaration of such rights on the basis of the judgments rendered by the Supreme Court[33]. Thus, horizons of constitutional law are expanding. In State of Maharashtra v Dr Praful . B. Desai[34]the Supreme Court observed: “It is presumed that the Parliament intends the court to apply to an ongoing Act a construction that continuously updates its wordings to allow for changes since the Act was initially framed. While it remains law, it has to be treated as always speaking. This means that in its application on any day, the language of the Act though necessarily embedded in its own time, is nevertheless to be construed in accordance with the need to treat it as a current law”.

At this stage the words of Justice Bhagwati in the case of National Textiles Workers Union v P.R.Ramakrishnan[35] need to be set out. They are: “We cannot allow the dead hand of the past to stifle the growth of the living present. Law cannot stand still; it must change with the changing social concepts and values. If the bark that protects the tree fails to grow and expand along with the tree, it will either choke the tree or if it is a living tree it will shed that bark and grow a living bark for itself. Similarly, if the law fails to respond to the needs of changing society, then either it will stifle the growth of the society and choke its progress or if the society is vigorous enough, it will cast away the law, which stands in the way of its growth. Law must therefore constantly be on the move adapting itself to the fast-changing society and not lag behind”.

It is further trite that the law although may be constitutional when enacted but with passage of time the same may be held to be unconstitutional in view of the changed situation[36]. These changed circumstances may also create a vacuum in the legal system, which has to be suitably filled up by the legislature. If the legislature fails to meet the need of the hour, the courts may interfere and fill-in the vacuum by giving proper directions. These directions would be binding and enforceable in law until suitable legislation is enacted to occupy the field[37]. Thus, directions given by the court will operate only till the law is made by the legislature and in that sense temporary in nature. Once legislation is made, the court has to make an independent assessment of it. In embarking on this exercise, the points of disclosure indicated by this court, even if they be tentative or ad hoc in nature, should be given due weight and substantial departure there from cannot be countenanced[38]. The courts may also rely upon International treaties and conventions for the effective enforcement of the municipal laws provided they are not in derogation with municipal laws.

The above discussion unerringly points towards the permissibility and democratic nature of the judicial review in India. The judicial review in India is absolutely essential and not undemocratic because the judiciary while interpreting the constitution or other statutes is expressing the will of the people of India as a whole who have reposed absolute faith and confidence in the Indian judiciary. If the judiciary interprets the Constitution in its true spirit and the same goes against the ideology and notions of the ruling political party, then we must not forget that the Constitution of India reflects the will of the people of India at large as against the will of the people who are represented for the time being by the ruling party. If we can appreciate this reality, then all arguments against the democratic nature of the judicial review would vanish. The judicial review would be undemocratic only if the judiciary ignores the concept of separation of powers and indulges in “unnecessary and undeserving judicial activism”. The judiciary must not forget its role of being an interpreter and should not undertake and venture into the task of lawmaking, unless the situation demands so. The judiciary must also not ignore the self-imposed restrictions, which have now acquired a status of “prudent judicial norm and behaviour”. If the Indian judiciary takes these two “precautions”, then it has the privilege of being the “most democratic judicial institution of the world, representing the biggest democracy of the world”.  

                                                        TABLE OF CASES

 [1] Eugene V. Rostow: The democratic character of the judicial review ((1952) 66 Harv .L.R 193,) 

[2] Ram Jawaya v State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 549, at 556.

[3] P. Kannadasan v State of T.N (1996) 5 SCC 670.

[4] Chandra Mohan v State of U.P, AIR 1967 SC1987, at 1993.

[5] KartarSingh v State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569, at 736 to 738.

[6] 2004 (1) SCALE 84.

[7] L.Chandra Kumar v U.O.I, (1997) 3SCC 261.

[8] U.O.I v S.B.Vohra (2004) 2 SCC 150.

[9] (2001) 1 SCC 582.

[10] 2003 (3) SCALE 263.

[11] Teri Oat Estates (p) Ltd v U.T. Chandigarh (2004) 2 SCC 130.

[12] AIR 1952 SC 196.

[13] (2001) 2 SCC 386.

[14] E.P. Royappa v State Of T.N, (1974) 4 SCC 3.

[15] The famous case Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corpn (KB at .229:ALL ER p. 682) commonly known as “The Wednesbury’s case”

[16] 2004 (3) SCALE 565.

[17] J.P.Bansal v State of Rajasthan, 2003(3) SCALE 154.

[18] C.G.E.S v Calcutta Municipal Corporation, 2003(6) SCALE 802.

[19] (1999) 9 SCC 700.

[20] P.U.C.L v U.O.I, (2004) 2 SCC 476.

[21] Balram Kumawat  v U.O.I, (2003) 7 SCC 628.

[22] 2003(3) SCALE 154.

[23] (2003) 7 SCC 121.

[24] (2003) 9 SCC 592.

[25] 2003 (10) SCALE 967.

[26] (2003) 5 SCC 437.

[27] P.U.C.L v U.O.I, AIR 2003 SC 2363.

[28] State of Rajasthan v U.O.I, (1973) 3 SCC 592.

[29] (2001) 7 SCC 231.

[30] Onkarlal Bajaj v U.O.I, AIR 2003 SC 2562.

[31] (2002) 4 SCC 388.

[32] Dwarka Prasad v B.D.Aggarwal, (2003) 6 SCC230.

[33] P.U.C.L v U.O.I, (2003) (3) SCALE 263.

[34] (2003) 4 SCC 601.

[35] (1983) 1 SCC 228.

[36] John Vallamattom v U.O.I, (2003) 6 SCC 611.

[37]  Vishaka v state of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS REFERRED

1. “DD. Basu” Shorer Constitution of India, 13^th ed.2003, Wadhwa Nagpur.
2. “H.M. Seervai” Constitutional Law of India, 4^th wd.2002, Universal Book Traders.
3. “D.D. Basu” Constitutional Remedies and Writs, 2^nd ed.1999, Kamal Law House.
4. “Gururaja Chari” Supreme Courts Rules, Practice and Procesure, 2^nd ed.2003, Wadhwa and Co.
5. “J.N.Pandey” Constitution of India, 3^rd ed.1999, Central Law Agency.
6. “M.P.Jain” Indian Constitutional Law, 5^th ed.2003, Wadhwa and Co.
7. “P.M.Bakshi” The Constitution of India, 5^th ed.2003 Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd.
8. “P.Ramanatha Aiyer” The Law Lexicon, 2^nd ed.2002, Wadhwa and Co.
9. Roscoe Pound, An Introduction To The Philosophy Of Law, London: Yale University Press, 1954.